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Priority-setting in Mine Action: 
   Getting More Value for the Investment
This article presents an overview of the main elements and key challenges involved in implementing 
sound national prioritization systems in mine-action programs. Since all mine/explosive remnants 
of war-affected countries are different, the article does not provide a standard blueprint; rather, it 
introduces the basic principles, components and considerations involved in prioritization. This will 
be valuable when implementing and designing priority-setting systems that cater to national and 
local contexts in each mine- /ERW-affected country.
by Albert Souza Mülli and Ted Paterson [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
Few topics are as hotly debated within the mine-action industry as prioritization. What actions should be done first? Which tasks should receive the 
most resources? Who should set the priorities: mine-action 
experts, government officials, people in affected communities 
or perhaps donors? How should the quality or effectiveness of 
prioritization be assessed?
This debate is warranted. The aim of priority-setting is to 
get the most value-for-money possible. The most important is-
sue determining whether a national mine-action program per-
forms well—whether it delivers good value-for-money—is not 
the quality of its survey and clearance 
technology, how hard its staff works 
or even how well-trained its managers 
are; rather, the most important issue 
is whether the program is doing the 
right tasks. Prioritization is about selecting the right actions 
and dedicating the necessary resources on a timely basis to en-
sure tasks are accomplished as efficiently as possible.
A number of programs have experimented with approach-
es taken from decision theory and risk management, including 
Multi-Criteria Analysis and the PROMETHEE method—the 
most sophisticated technique applied to mine action thus 
far.1,2,3,4,5 Through such experimentation and debate, many 
mine-action centers and operators have developed what appear 
to be good systems for setting priorities, with well-conceived 
criteria and opportunities for input from multiple stakehold-
ers, including people in mine-affected communities. 
However, an examination of how well mine-action prior-
ities match country needs often leads to very disappointing 
outcomes, even in well-established programs in which each 
operator has seemingly sound prioritization procedures. For 
example, in one country, only 4 percent of a recent year’s de-
mining efforts took place in the most-affected communities 
(i.e., those that experienced multiple casualties in the previ-
ous three years). How could this occur in a country with ex-
perienced operators and a consensus that casualty reduction 
should be one of the most important criteria for determining 
demining priorities?
In Cambodia, for example, Mine Action Planning Units 
are provincial government units created in the most mine-
affected provinces to assist in the identification of demining 
priorities and the formulation of pro-
vincial mine-action plans. The main 
task of MAPUs is to work with villag-
es and communities to identify local 
demining preferences, but the actu-
al pattern of clearance has little relationship to community 
preferences. As a result, in 2000, only 56 percent of the area 
planned for clearance was actually demined; the number in-
creased in 2001 and 2002.6,7 
What’s the Problem?
Prioritization is an effort to match resources with people’s 
preferences, aimed at delivering the greatest possible benefits 
with the resources available. A key problem in mine action is 
that those providing the resources generally are not the ones 
who will benefit from mine-action services. Most resourc-
es come from donor countries and are delivered through a 
chain of intermediaries (United Nations agencies, internation-
al firms, nongovernmental organizations, local governments, 
etc.) before reaching affected communities and individuals. 
Even if each donor, U.N. agency, operator, etc., in the chain ef-
fectively sets its priorities, the national program’s results are 
almost certain to be disappointing, unless national authorities 
(or the U.N. where it has been asked to take overall responsibil-
ity) can create and enforce a prioritization system for the over-
all national program.
Put simply, sound priorities for individual projects or pro-
grams will not add up to a sound set of national-program pri-
orities, unless some agency has the authority to assess the 
overall package and convince or require individual donors 
and operators to make adjustments.8 Achieving value-for-
money demands a coordinated program-wide approach.9
Toward National and Regional Prioritization Systems
Most national mine-action programs already have sound 
procedures for making decisions regarding which tasks to 
complete first. Local or regional prioritization deals mainly 
with identifying tasks that will produce the largest expected 
benefits and assigning resources to those specific tasks. While 
this local prioritization is crucial to ensure a national mine-
action program’s tasks are carried out effectively and efficient-
ly, it will not deliver high value-for-money unless a broader 
system is in place to ensure the bulk of resources are allocated 
to the most heavily impacted areas. 
National prioritization is concerned with how resources 
will be allocated among geographic areas, program compo-
nents, operators, etc., whereas local prioritization is the de-
termination of which specific tasks to complete first, once 
the resources are allocated at the national level. If a national 
mine-action program delivers value-for-money, the process-
es and procedures put in place for national and local prior-
itization must be interlinked and coordinated. Therefore, 
prioritization must be viewed as a system of inter-connected 
decisions across different levels. After all, assigning resources 
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“Achieving good value-for-money 
is essential for an effective and effi-
cient national mine-action program 
to meet a country’s strategic goals.”
1
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to any one task will invariably make them unavailable for oth-
er tasks, so a broader perspective is required to ensure each 
piece fits together.
A national priority-setting system invariably includes ac-
tors, resources, information, a structure, processes (i.e., where, 
when, by whom and how decisions are made) and policies. A 
good priority-setting system must be informed by the following:
1. Consideration for the interests of relevant actors to 
make the right decisions
2. High-quality, relevant and complete data 
3.  Regular analysis of the data to guide decision-makers 
Strategic, operational and task requirements are the three 
necessary levels of prioritization. Strategic priorities should be 
established at the headquarters of the national mine-action pro-
gram and should take into account the preferences of all stake-
holders; however, allocations must also be in line with national 
development priorities. Mine action is a means to an end, not an 
end in itself. Therefore, strategic priorities should be set accord-
ing to broader political, economic and social priorities in the 
country as a whole. Operational priorities should be deter-
mined by the relevant program manager, who should identify 
priorities using relevant data from analysis of non-technical 
or technical surveys and the expressed perceptions of at-risk 
communities and landmine victims. 
Afghanistan offers an example of successful prioritization. 
In 2009, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan 
found hundreds of minefields close to communities. These 
minefields were known as “low hanging fruit,” because mine 
removal was considered an easy task—MACCA had the nec-
essary equipment available. However, these areas remained 
for more than two decades without clearance. The minefields’ 
small size deterred teams from clearing the area, since the 
fields would lower their productivity targets. However, after 
realizing this problem, MACCA instructed operators to estab-
lish small teams and created new productivity standards for 
small fields, giving “low hanging fruit” locations a priority. 
Different program components and operators some-
times have diverging priorities, but in order for the national 
mine-action program to operate in a sensible and coordinat-
ed fashion, headquarters is responsible for ensuring that all 
three priority levels add up and fit well together. Ensuring 
these requirements are met usually depends on clear guid-
ance from the national mine-action authority of the national 
government; a clear-cut list of strategic objectives will allow 
decision-makers at all levels to understand essential tasks. A 
national policy, even a simple one, is crucial to determine who 
does what, by which processes and through which structure.
Sustainability and National Ownership
Sustainability is key to ensuring that a priority-setting 
system continues to function beyond the presence of the in-
ternational community. The most important governmental 
processes for prioritization are planning and budgeting, but 
many mine-/ERW-affected countries lack proper planning 
and budgeting systems, particularly in the immediate post-
conflict period. As a result, many mine-action programs are 
set up as “parallel systems” (i.e., separate 
from the host government’s own plan-
ning and budgeting systems), making 
the eventual transfer to national author-
ity long and expensive. For this reason, 
mine-action officials need to understand 
that, even in cases where proper nation-
al planning and budgeting systems are 
not in place, they should align the pri-
ority-setting system with whatever na-
tional structures exist or ensure that 
this alignment occurs in the very early 
stages of transition to national owner-
ship. If not, the essential capabilities of 
the mine-action program will probably 
not be sustained.
Establishing and Adapting a  
Prioritization System
Mine-action officials need to be 
aware that a country’s mine-action pro-
gram will encounter significant chang-
es as it transitions from post-conf lict 
to reconstruction and eventually, de-
velopment. As the political, social and 
economic environment evolves, peo-
ple’s needs change and priorities need 
modification. 
Mine-action organizations should 
always focus on directing the most re-
sources to support the most strategically 
important efforts identified by all rele-
vant stakeholders at any given point in 
time, which may mean that during post-
conflict stabilization, mine-action ser-
vices will center on clearing roads or key 
infrastructure. However, as life returns 
to normal and previous mine-action 
efforts have helped return children to 
school and enabled access to key roads, 
priorities should align with longer-term 
development requirements, including 
shifting resources to demining agricul-
tural land or land for natural-resource 
extraction (e.g., mining). 
International actors will also play a 
smaller role as transition progresses. In 
a conflict’s immediate aftermath, outside 
funding and expertise may be crucial for 
emergency clearance and risk-education 
services, but as a country moves from 
conflict into reconstruction and devel-
opment, national ownership becomes 
increasingly important. Mine-action of-
ficials should expect rising levels of na-
tional ownership and more input from 
different government levels, from the 
national to the provincial, with local 
governments gradually assuming more 
responsibilities. As a result, internation-
al actors must switch from an opera-
tional focus to a capacity-development 
focus and should prepare for the mine-
action program’s full indigenization, 
including by providing operations and 
senior-management training to local 
mine-action and government officials. 
Conclusion
Achieving good value-for-money is 
essential for an effective and efficient 
national mine-action program to meet a 
country’s strategic goals. In an environ-
ment where international donors try to 
get more results for money spent, well-
coordinated program-wide priority-set-
ting systems are critical to a national 
mine-action program’s performance. 
For a more detailed and comprehen-
sive understanding of prioritization, see 
the first four of the Geneva Internation-
al Centre for Humanitarian Demining's 
“Priority-Setting in Mine Action” Issue 
Briefs series, available on the GICHD 
website (http://snipurl.com/23jixsi). The 
objective of the series is to assist mine-
action programs in achieving greater 
value-for-money by designing and im-
plementing sound priority-setting sys-
tems. The Briefs enable mine-action 
officials to design and implement priori-
tization systems suitable to their respec-
tive place and time and adaptive to their 
changing national contexts. 
See Endnotes Page 82
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